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Abstract
In this paper, we show how the interaction between costly screen-
ing and competition in decentralized markets may prevent e¢ cient
matching. We examine this phenomenon in a simple dynamic model
of a professional labor market, where rms can pay a cost to interview
applicants who have private information about their own ability. In-
e¢ ciencies arise when a rm decides not to interview potentially able
candidates since it infers that su¢ ciently good candidates will be hired
by more productive rms. This e¤ect is robust to changes in the infor-
mation structure of the market, but it can be mitigated by subsidizing
screening costs.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we construct a simple model of an entry-level professional
labor market (such as those for lawyers, MBAs, academics, and others)
where applicants have private information about their abilities and rms of
di¤erent productivities can interview applicants at a cost to uncover that
information. There is an exogenous interview schedule in which applicants
are matched with rms in each period. Hiring takes place subsequent to the
interview schedule. If a rm hires an applicant, production takes place and
the surplus is split proportionally.
In this game, able applicants may not be hired. This phenomenon arises
when a rm decides not to interview (and therefore does not hire) a po-
tentially able applicant since it foresees su¢ ciently good candidates will be
hired by more productive rms. In other words, competition from other
rms for the candidate makes the rm anticipate that it will su¤er from a
winners curse at the hiring stage.
This is a kind of unemployment that could, and in some cases, should be
avoided, since the rejected applicant may actually be a good match for the
rm. At the core of this ine¢ ciency is an externality; rms do not consider
workers surplus from a match when they decide whether to interview a
candidate. From a policy perspective, we demonstrate that lowering rms
screening costs through subsidies can improve welfare by increasing rms
surplus from a match, thereby mitigating the externality.
The e¤ect illustrated here is di¤erent from stigma as described in the
literature. There, it usually refers to a realized selection e¤ect; somebody or
something is inferred to have failed a screening test given their observable
current state. For example, unemployment or unemployment duration may
create an inference that a worker is of lower ability1. Our model di¤ers in two
ways. First, the observable current state does not provide any information - a
rm knows that its current candidate may have been previously interviewed,
but it has no information to use to update since job o¤ers take place later in
the game and interviews are unobservable. Second, it is the fact that rms
1See Greenwald (1986) and Lockwood (1991) for this e¤ect in the context of the labor
market. Taylor (1999) examines a similar "time-on-the-market" e¤ect for the housing
market. In the nance literature, the stigma e¤ect can be found in Dellariccia, Friedman,
and Marquez (1999) for the credit market, Landier (2006) for entrepeneurial nance, and
Ennis and Weinberg (2013) in the context of the Fed discount window.
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compete for workers that creates the negative inference. A low productivity
rm that knows it will lose out on an able worker to a more productive rm
will decide not to interview the worker.
A related paper is Ely and Siegel (2013), who also analyze a model of a
labor market with screening costs. The two models share a strict ranking of
rms and an exogenous wage structure. In both models, lower ranked rms
may prefer not to incur the screening cost, anticipating a winners curse.
However, unlike Ely and Siegel (2013), our model has multiple workers and
multiple rounds of interviews. Our model is also di¤erent in that the surplus
from hiring is rm specic and the focus is on unemployment.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the simple
model with two rms and two applicants. In Section 3, we derive the market
equilibrium and demonstrate the main result. In Section 4, we consider how
subsidizing interviews can increase welfare. In Section 5, we extend the
model to allow for uncertainty about rm types. In Section 6, we conclude.
Proofs and a general model with F rms and X applicants can be found in
the Appendix.
2 The Model
In this section, we examine the case of two rms and two applicants. The
main result is shown in the Appendix to hold for the general case of multiple
rms and applicants. Specically, there are two rms i = 1; 2 of publicly
observable productivity f1 and f2, where f2 > f1 > 0; and two applicants,
j = 1; 2; who have privately observable productivity xj 2 fL;M;Hg, where
H > M > L > 0: The realization of the types of the two applicants are
independent and determined by the probabilities pL; pM ; and pH , which
are all positive and sum to one. A rm with productivity fi who hires
an applicant of ability xj creates an output ij = fixj . The players split
the output from the match according to an exogenous sharing rule: rms
get ij and applicants get (1   )ij , where  2 (0; 1). We explicitly
model the surplus as multiplicative for ease of presentation, although any
supermodular function should give the same results.
We assume that rms have an outside option equal to fit, which they
receive if they do not hire anyone. The value of the threshold t is common
across rms and M > t > L, implying that neither rm would willingly hire
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a type L applicant.2 Applicants have a reservation payo¤ of zero if they are
not hired.
The game has two periods. At the start of the game, nature draws a
publicly observable interview schedule and the types of the two applicants.
For simplicity, we will assume that interviews are costless in period 1, but
costly in period 2. This assumption reduces the number of cases to analyze.3
In period 1, each rm is matched with an applicant. The rms observe
the type of the applicant they are matched with, but not the type of the
other applicant.
In period 2, the rms are matched with the applicants they did not match
with in period 1. Each rm decides whether to interview the applicant it
is matched with in the second period at a cost of C > 0. An interview
fully reveals the applicants type to the interviewing rm, but the other rm
cannot observe this type or whether the applicant was interviewed.
Firms then choose whether to make any of the applicants an o¤er.4 Firms
make o¤ers simultaneously and they can only make o¤ers to applicants if
they have interviewed them.5 Finally, the applicants decide whether to
accept any o¤er.
To summarize, the timeline of the game is:
2Applicants of type L are never hired in equilibrium in our model, but are necessary
to justify the use of interviews over hiring without interviews. However, a modied model
where interviews give incorrect signals about the applicantstype with a small probability
would have similar results and have L applicants hired in equilibrium.
3We show in a previous version of the paper (Josephson and Shapiro (2012)) that in a
game with positive and identical interview costs in both periods, there is an equilibrium
such that all rms interview in the rst period. In other equilibria of this game, some
rms may opt out of interviewing in round one. This makes unemployment even more
likely than in our model.
4Allowing rms to make (open) o¤ers in the rst period as well does not alter the main
results.
5Assuming that pLf2(t   L) > C is necessary and su¢ cient to ensure that neither
rm 1 nor rm 2 would hire without interviewing.
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Figure 1: Timeline
We assume that the structure of the game is common knowledge to all
participants and that the following conditions hold for i = 1; 2:
pMfi (M   t) < C; (C1)
pHfi(H  M) > C: (C2)
Condition C1 says that the rm would prefer to go unmatched rather
than interview an applicant when it doesnt have the possibility of hiring a
high type. This condition is key to our result. Note that the interview cost
parameter C must be positive for this to hold.
Condition C2 implies that a rm with an applicant of type M in period
1 would prefer to interview a new applicant in the second period and make
an o¤er to the best of the two. It converts the potential mismatch under C1
into a problem of unemployment for productive applicants.
The left hand sides of C1 and C2 represent the option values of inter-
viewing and the right hand sides the cost.
In addition to the above conditions, we will for expositional purposes
assume that if a rm is matched with an applicant of the same type in
periods one and two, and it can hire either of them with probability one,
then it will always prefer the latter. These conditions pin down parameters
for which unemployment of able applicants will occur.
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3 The market equilibrium
We start by analyzing the market solution, where rms maximize their prof-
its by strategically making decisions about interviews and o¤ers. To simplify
notation, we use the convention that rm 1 is matched with applicant 1 and
rm 2 with applicant 2 in period one. We summarize equilibrium properties
in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the hiring game
with two rms and two applicants:
i) If x2 = H, rm 2 will hire applicant 2. If x2 = M or L, rm 2 will
interview applicant 1 and hire her if she is of type M or H.
ii) Firm 1 never interviews applicant 2.
The proof is in the appendix.
To understand this result, rst note that rm 2 will always hire its rst-
period applicant if she is of type H. The applicant prefers an o¤er from
the more productive rm, and there is no reason for rm 2 to interview in
period 2 for such a draw.
The rst property now follows from C2, which implies that if rm 2 is
matched with and applicant of type M or L in the rst period, it prefers to
interview in the second period since the option value of being able to hire
an applicant of type H exceeds the interview cost.
The second property follows by C1, which implies that rm 1 nds it too
costly to discover whether the second-period applicant is of type M or L.
If the draw of applicant types is such that x1 = H or x1 = M , and
x2 = M , then it follows from Proposition 1 that rm 2 will interview and
hire applicant 1, but that applicant 2 will remain unemployed.
Corollary 1 In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the hiring game with
two rms and two applicants, if x1 = H or x1 = M and x2 = M , applicant
2 will be unemployed.
The key insight here is that the combination of potential competition
and screening creates unemployment. The competition element is the low
productivity rms realization that it will not be able to hire an H worker
who has been interviewed by a high productivity rm. The screening element
is that given the remaining possible candidate types, the expected benet to
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the low productivity rm from another interview does not cover the interview
cost.
Notice that the screening element is ine¢ cient because of an externality;
the rm bears the full cost of the interview, but the M-type applicant shares
the benet if she were to be hired. In the following section, we will examine
if the government can correct this through a subsidy.
A rm will interview its second-period applicant if she was previously
interviewed by a less productive rm. This is a consequence of C2, which
states that the rm is willing to interview if it its rst interviewed worker is
not of type H.
Lastly, by Corollary 1, the probability of an unemployed applicant of
type M is pM (pH + pM ).
4 Subsidies for Interviews
We now investigate if a social planner could improve on the market equilib-
rium by the use of transfers. More precisely, we will assume that the social
planner must adhere to the given interview schedule, and study the e¤ect of
subsidizing the cost of interviews for the least productive rm.6 The cost of
the subsidy could be nanced via an up-front lump-sum tax on rms which
does not violate the rmsparticipation constraints.
The rst best solution where there is perfect information about worker
types leads to a fully assortative match. We now demonstrate that the
appropriate subsidy also achieves the assortative match.
Proposition 2 If rm 1s interview cost in period 2 is partly subsidized, by
an amount S, such that C > S > (C   pMf1 (M   t)), then in any Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium:
i) Firm 1 interviews in the second period if x1 = M or H; and the expected
cost of the subsidy is (1  pL)S.
ii) Applicants of type L are not hired and the other types of applicants are
matched assortatively with the rms.
The proof is in the appendix.
6The same equilibrium can be sustained if we assume the planner can force rm 1 to
interview.
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A key ine¢ ciency of the market solution is an externality; each rm
bears the full cost of any interview, but able applicants share the benets
if they are hired. By subsidizing the interview cost of the least productive
rm, a social planner can potentially overcome this problem.
The argument of the proof is as follows. Firm 1 prefers not to use the
subsidy if matched with an applicant of type L in the rst period since the
subsidy does not cover the full interview cost and since, for such a draw, it
will never be able to hire an applicant of type M or H in the second period.
If matched with an applicant of type M or H, it has incentives to use the
subsidy to interview in the second period since it can potentially hire the
least productive applicant, which may be of type M .
Subsidizing selected rmsinterview costs could be employed also in a
general setting with multiple applicants and rms, for instance by subsidiz-
ing the subset of rms receiving applicants from more productive rms in the
second period. However, it may not be possible to achieve the assortative
match in this case.
Comparing the outcome with a subsidy with the market solution, the
market solution implies a net welfare loss given by:
(pH + pM ) pMf1 (M   t)  (pH + pM )C (1)
The rst term represents the welfare loss from rm 1 not hiring when
x1 = H or x1 = M , and x2 = M . The second term is actually a welfare
gain; it represents the savings on the interview cost whenever x1 6= L, as
rm 1 never interviews in the market solution.
The net welfare loss from the market solution is clearly decreasing in ,
the share of surplus retained by the rm. This is because the externality
that the rm imposes on workers by making a decision whether to interview
is reduced - as  increases the rm internalizes more of the externality and
its choice becomes the e¢ cient choice for total surplus.
The net welfare loss itself may be positive or negative. To see this,
suppose that C1 is satised for all  2 [0; 1]. Then (1) is negative for 
su¢ ciently close to one. It is positive for  su¢ ciently close to zero if and
only if pMf1M   C is positive. On the other hand, If C1 is violated for 
su¢ ciently close to one, then (1) is clearly positive for every  such that C1
holds.
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The intuition for these comparative statics is the following. If the inter-
view cost is not too large compared to the option value from matching with
an applicant of type M , then welfare can be improved by subsidizing the
interview cost so that all able applicants are matched. However, if the in-
terview cost is so large that rm 1 would not interview, in spite of receiving
almost all of the surplus from a match, then the gain for the applicant is
too small to outweigh the cost of the subsidy.
While subsidies to employers are sometimes used as an active labor mar-
ket policy to spur employment (see Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999)),
they focus on subsidizing hiring directly as opposed to subsidizing inter-
views. They also generally focus on applicants who have traditionally lower
employment possibilities, such as young workers. Proposition 2 suggests that
focusing on the demand side, i.e. rms with lower productivity that nd it
di¢ cult to compete for workers, could reduce information asymmetries and
unemployment7.
5 Changing the Information Structure
So far, we have assumed that the rm productivities are common knowledge.
Although this makes the model more tractable, it may not be realistic in
markets where there are more than a few players. Hence in this section,
we look at an example where this assumption is relaxed and show that
unemployment of able applicants may still exist.
We change the model such that the productivities of rms are private
information. More precisely, we assume there are two rms, i = a; b, and
the productivity of each rm is drawn independently from a continuous
distribution G() with support [f1; f2], where f2 > f1 > 0 as before. Hence,
in this setup f1 and f2 are not the productivities of the two rms, but the
endpoints of the interval to which they belong. We maintain the assumption
that C2 holds8 for f1 and f2, implying that it holds for all productivities in
7Market institutions might develop alternative ways of resolving this issue, potentially
aided by government. For example, internship programs (e.g. summer internships for
MBAs (see Kuhnen and Oyer (2010)) and summer associate positions for lawyers (see
Ginsburg and Wolf (2003))), temporary positions (for the case of Spain, see Guell and
Petrongolo (2007)), and apprentice programs (see Wolter and Ryan (2011)) can take this
role.
8We do not assume C1 holds since it is not necessary for the results in this section.
The reason is that the ine¢ ciency stems from the case where one rm has an H candidate
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[f1; f2]:
If the draw is fi, then rm i will believe it has the lowest productivity
with probability 1 G (fi) and the highest productivity with complementary
probability. We assume there are two applicants, one of productivity xa;
who may interview at rm a in period 1 and at rm b in period 2, and one
of productivity xb, who has the reverse interview schedule. When a rm
interviews an applicant, the applicant learns the productivity of the rm.
As in the main model, after the two rounds of interviews are complete,
each rm may make one o¤er to an interviewed candidate, o¤ers are made
simultaneously, and applicants will then accept or reject o¤ers.
The key result for the main model, that an able applicant may not be
interviewed by a rm who would be a good match, holds also in this setting.
We demonstrate this in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 There is a symmetric equilibrium such that a rm with a
rst-period applicant of type:
i) H does not interview in the second round, but makes an o¤er to the rst-
period candidate,
ii) M interviews i¤ pHfi (G(fi)H + (1 G (fi)) t M)  C and then
makes an o¤er to the second-period candidate i¤ the candidate has type H
and otherwise makes and o¤er to the rst-period candidate,
iii) L interviews i¤ pHG(fi)fi (H   t)+pMG(fi)fi (M   t)  C and then
makes an o¤er to the second-period candidate i¤ that candidate has type M
or H.
The proof is in the appendix.
This result points out that for draws where rm a interviews an H can-
didate in the rst round, rm b interviews anM candidate in the rst round,
rm a has lower productivity than rm b and pHfb (G(fb)H + (1 G (fb)) t M) 
C, the M candidate will go unmatched. This is exactly the result from our
main model; rm a wont interview because of the likelihood that it will not
be able to hire an H type.
and the other has an M candidate in round 1. In our main model, if rm 1 had the H
candidate, it would certainly lose it to rm 2. Now the rm with an H candidate in round
1 has a chance of keeping this candidate if the other rm does not interview; the other
rm will not interview if it has su¢ ciently low productivity. The probability of this event
is large enough that the rm with an H candidate prefers not to interview irregardless of
C1.
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6 Conclusion
In a simple model describing the interview process for professional labor
markets, we have pointed out that ine¢ cient unemployment may result if
screening is costly and rms compete for workers. This occurs when appli-
cants types are private information and rms decide not to interview an
applicant who was previously interviewed by a more productive rm. This
could cause able applicants to go unemployed and productive vacancies to
go unlled. This e¤ect applies to other markets as well, such as the housing
market and credit market.
Our work suggests several directions for future research. First, changing
the setting to allow for strategic wage setting and idiosyncratic preferences
among rms and applicants are natural extensions. Second, analyzing in-
terview markets for non-entry level applicants poses interesting challenges.
Third, it would be of interest to understand how applicants match with rms
given the ine¢ ciencies explored in the paper, potentially in a framework with
directed search.
A Appendix
A.1 The model with F rms and X applicants
We start by generalizing the two-period model to F rms and X applicants
in order to illustrate that unemployment of able applicants exists also in a
more realistic environment. Consider the general case with rms i = 1; :::; F
of heterogeneous productivities f1 < f2 < ::: < fF ; with F  2. Applicants
are labeled by j = 1; :::; X and can still be one of three types: L;M; or H.
We assume that applicants are allocated according to an interview schedule
which is random but has the properties that (i) no applicant interviews with
the same rm twice, (ii) only one applicant is allocated to each rm in each
period, and (iii) if there are less or equal number of agents on one side of
the market, they should all be matched. We maintain conditions C1 and C2
for all rms and refer to the resulting game as the general hiring game.
A.2 Useful Lemmas
The following Lemmas will be used in the proofs of the propositions in the
text.
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Lemma 1 In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the general hiring game,
a rm with a rst-period applicant of type H; who is matched with no rm
or a rm of lower productivity in the second period, hires this applicant.
Proof. Let rm i denote a rm whose rst-period applicant j; of pro-
ductivity xj = H; is matched with no rm or a rm of lower productivity in
the second period. First note that since applicant j knows the productivity
of the rms it will be matched with in the rst and second period, it will
always accept an o¤er from rm i. Second, it is clear that rm i will never
interview a possible second-period applicant j + 1 since it would thereby
incur the interview cost without any possibility of being matched with a
more productive applicant.
Lemma 2 In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the general hiring game,
a rm with a rst-period applicant who is not of type H and a second-period
applicant who was unmatched or matched with a rm of lower productivity
in the rst period interviews its second-period applicant.
Proof. Let rm i be a rm with a rst-period applicant j of productivity
xj = ?; M or L (where ? represents no applicant) and a second-period
applicant j + 1; who was interviewed by a less productive rm i + 1 or no
rm in the rst period. It follows trivially from C2 that rm i interviews
applicant j + 1 if she is not interviewed by any rm in period 1. The same
argument applies if the applicant is interviewed by a less productive rm
i+ 1 since the applicant will always prefer an o¤er from i in the o¤er stage.
Lemma 3 In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the general hiring game,
a rm never interviews a second-period applicant who was matched with a
rm of higher productivity in the rst period.
Proof. By Lemma 1, a rm i receiving an applicant j + 1 from a more
productive rm i+1 in the second period will never be able hire this applicant
if xj+1 = H. Moreover, the probability of hiring an applicant j + 1 of type
M is at most pM . Hence, by C1, rm i will strictly prefer not to interview
in period 2.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Follows from Lemmas 1 and 2.
(ii) First note that rm 1 will never make an o¤er to applicant 1 if x1 = L
since such an o¤er would be accepted and give the rm a worse payo¤ than
the outside option. From Lemma 2, it follows that in any equilibrium, rm
2 interviews in period 2 if x2 6= H. From Lemma 3, it follows that rm 1
will never interview applicant 2. 
A.4 Results for the General Hiring Game
Proposition 4 In the general hiring game:
i) In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, rms only interview their second-
period applicant if she was interviewed by a lower-productivity rm or no
rm in the rst period.
ii) In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with F = X, there exists a draw
of applicant productivities such that at least one applicant of type M will
remain unemployed.
Proof. (i) Follows from Lemma 3.
(ii) Consider a sequence of at least three rms (for the case of two rms and
two applicants the statement follows by Proposition 2 above). Dene a local
maximizer to be a rm that has a higher productivity than both the rm it
gives an applicant to in period 2 and the rm that it receives an applicant
from in period 2 i.e. if we arrange rms in a circle such that the applicant
matched with rm k in period 1 (whose productivity we denote as xk) is
matched with rm k  1 in period 2, rm k is a local maximizer if and only
if fk 1 < fk > fk+1 (where we use superscripts to denote position in the
circle). It is obvious that at least one local maximizer must exist for any
sequence of rms. Let xk and xk+1 be the productivity of rm ks rst and
second-period applicants respectively. By Lemma 2, rm k will interview an
applicant of productivity xk+1 if xk = L or M . If, in addition, xk+1 = M or
H it will hire her. By Lemma 3, rm k   1 will not interview applicant k.
Hence, an applicant k of type M will be unemployed if xk+1 = M or H.
Interestingly enough, although more applicants than rms leads to un-
employment, it may prevent unemployment of able applicants. Consider the
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case of two rms and four applicants. If the two rms do not interview any
applicants in common, there is no room for adverse selection.
On the other hand, when there are more rms than applicants (i.e. F >
X), unemployment of able applicants is possible, but not guaranteed. First,
consider the case of three rms with productivities f3 > f2 > f1, and two
applicants. The rst applicant is of type H and matches with rm 1 in
period 1 and rm 3 in period 2, and the second applicant is of type M and
matches with rm 3 in period 1 and rm 2 in period 3. In this case, the
best rm will hire H, but the M applicant will remain unemployed because
of the information problem. Second, consider the case of two rms and one
applicant. In this case, the rm of highest productivity will always end up
hiring the applicant if she is not of type L, implying no unemployment.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
First, note that the subsidy to rm 1 does not a¤ect Lemmas 1 and 2. By
Lemma 1, if rm 2 is matched with an applicant of type H in period 1, it
hires this applicant and abstains from interviewing in period 2. By Lemma
2, if rm 2 is not matched with an applicant of type H in period 1, then it
interviews in period 2. If rm 2s second-period applicant has weakly higher
productivity than its rst-period applicant and she is not of type L, rm 2
will make her an o¤er and hire her given our assumptions. If the second-
period applicant is of type L and the rst-period applicant is of type M ,
rm 2 will hire the latter. This demonstrates that rm 2 will always hire
the most productive applicant, provided she is not of type L.
Firm 1 has no incentives to use the subsidy to interview in the second
period if matched with an applicant of type L in period one since any second-
period match of type M or H will be hired by rm 2. If, on the other hand,
rm 1 is matched with an applicant of type M or H in the rst period, it
has incentives to use the subsidy and interview in period two. The reason
is that there is a positive probability that the second period applicant is
of type M , in which case it will not be hired by rm 2. In this case, rm
1 extends an o¤er to the least productive of the applicants provided she is
not of type L. If both applicants are of type M , then rm 1 makes an o¤er
to the applicant it was matched with last since the other applicant will be
hired by rm 2. Firm 1s o¤er will be accepted since the applicant will not
receive any o¤er from rm 2.
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In conclusion, in any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium applicants of type H
and M will be matched assortatively with the rms, and applicants of type
L will never be hired. The expected cost of the subsidy is (1  pL)S since
rm 1 interviews whenever its rst-period applicant is of type M or H. 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
We begin by proving two lemmas that will prove useful for the proof.
Lemma 4 pHfi (G(fi)H + (1 G (fi)) t M) = C has a unique solution
f 2 (f1; f2) :
Proof. The equation must have at least one solution and it must be
interior since the left-hand side is continuous in fi, equals pMf1 (t M) < 0
for fi = f1, and pHf2 (H  M) > C for fi = f2 (by C2). To show that the
solution is unique, di¤erentiate the left-hand side with respect to fi:
pH (G(fi)H + (1 G (fi)) t M) + pHfig(fi) (H   t)
The second term is non-negative, and the rst term is positive for any fi such
that pHfi (G(fi)H + (1 G (fi)) t M)  C. Hence, if f is a solution to
the equation, then the left-hand side is larger than C for any fi 2 ( f; f2],
ruling out multiple solutions.
Lemma 5 pHG(fi)fi(H   t) + pMG(fi)fi (M   t) = C has a unique
solution f^ 2  f1; f.
Proof. The left-hand side of the equation is continuous and increasing in
fi. It takes the value zero for fi = f1, and pHf2 (H   t)+pMf2 (M   t) >
C for fi = f2 (by C2). This proves that the equation has a unique and
interior solution f^ . To show that f^ < f; we compute the di¤erence between
the the left-hand sides of the equations in Lemmas 4 and 5:
fiG(fi) (pH (H   t)) + pM (M   t))
 fipH (G(fi)H + (1 G (fi)) t M)
= fi (M   t) (pMG(fi) + pH) :
Since the di¤erence is positive, it follows that f^ < f .
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We will now prove the proposition by showing that there are no protable
deviations from the strategy when the other rm employs the same strategy.
From Lemma 4 follows that there is a unique rm productivity f 2 (f1; f2)
such that the inequality on line ii) binds. From Lemma 5 follows that there
is a unique rm productivity f^ 2  f1; f such that the inequality on line iii)
binds. Dene the following variables:
q : = Pr

fj < fi j fj  f; fi

=
max

G (fi) G( f); 0
	
1 G( f) ;
q0 : = Pr

fj < fi j fj < f; fi

=
min

G (fi) ; G( f)
	
G( f)
;
r : = Pr
h
fj < fi j fj  f^ ; fi
i
=
max
n
G (fi) G(f^); 0
o
1 G(f^) ;
r0 : = Pr
h
fj < fi j fj < f^; fi
i
=
min
n
G (fi) ; G(f^)
o
G(f^)
:
i) First, suppose that a rm has a rst-period applicant of type H and
deviates from the proposed strategy by interviewing for some fi. It is clear
that interviewing and not making any o¤er when at least one applicant is
of type H or M is a dominated strategy. Dene sH and sM to be the
(possibly rm-productivity dependent) conditional probabilities of making
an o¤er to the second-period candidates after observing a type H and M
respectively (i.e. the conditional probabilities of making an o¤er to the rst-
period candidate are 1  sH and 1  sM , respectively). The expected payo¤
from interviewing is:
pHfi (sH (G (fi)H + (1 G (fi)) t) + (1  sH)H) (2)
+pMfi
 
sM
  
1 G( f)M +G( f) ((1  q0) t+ q0M)+
(1  sM )
 
G( f)H +
 
1 G( f) ((1  q) t+ qH)
!
+pLfi

1 G(f^)

rH +

1 G(f^)

(1  r) t+G(f^)H

  C:
The expected payo¤ from not interviewing is:
pHfiH + pMfi
 
G( f)H +
 
1 G( f) ((1  q) t+ qH) (3)
+pLfi

1 G(f^)

(rH + (1  r) t) +G(f^)H

:
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The di¤erence between (2) and (3) is:
 pHfisH (1 G (fi)) (H   t) (4)
+pMfisM
  
1 G( f) (M   (1  q) t  qH)
+G( f) ((1  q0) t+ q0M  H)
!
  C
The rst line of (4) is clearly non-positive. Evaluating the second line
for fi  f gives:
pMfisM
   
1 G( f) (M   t)   G (fi) G( f) (H   t)
 G( f) (H  M)
!
  C
 pMfisM
  
1 G( f) (M   t) G( f) (H  M)  C
=  C

pMfisM
pH f
+ 1

Evaluating the second line for fi < f gives:
pMfisM
  
1 G( f) (M   t) +
G (fi) (M   t) G( f) (H   t)
!
  C
 pMfisM
  
1 G( f) (M   t) G( f) (H  M)  C
=  C

pMfisM
pH f
+ 1

Hence, the rm prefers not to interview if it has a rst-period applicant
of type H.
ii) Second, suppose that a rm has a rst-period applicant of type M .
Using the same notation as above, the expected payo¤ from interviewing is:
pHfi (sH (G (fi)H + (1 G (fi)) t) + (1  sH)M) (5)
+pMfi (sM ((1 G(fi)) t+G(fi)M) + (1  sM )M)
+pLfi

1 G(f^)

(rM + (1  r) t) +G(f^)M

  C:
The expected value from not interviewing is:
pHfiM + pMfiM (6)
+pLfi

1 G(f^)

(rM + (1  r) t) +G(f^)M

:
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The di¤erence between (5) and (6) is:
pHfisH (G (fi)H + (1 G (fi)) t M)
 pMfisM ((1 G(fi)) (M   t))  C
Hence, the expected payo¤ is maximized if the rm interviews i¤
pHfi (G (fi)H + (1 G (fi)) t M)  C
and sets sM = 0 and sH = 1.
iii) Suppose lastly that the rm has a rst-period applicant of type L.
If it interviews and makes an o¤er to the second candidate i¤ she is not of
type L, the expected payo¤ is
pHfi (G (fi)H + (1 G (fi)) t) (7)
+pMfi (G (fi)M + (1 G (fi)) t) + pLfit  C:
If it does not interview, it strictly prefers not to make any o¤er, resulting in
a payo¤ of fit. The di¤erence between the two payo¤s is thus:
pHfiG (fi) (H   t) + pMfiG (fi) (M   t)  C:
Hence, the expected payo¤ is maximized if the rm interviews i¤ the last
expression is non-negative.
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